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How do institutions allow governments to manage dramatic variations of oil rents, and 
how do these variations impact public institutions is the twofold problem addressed here. 
We contend that high dependence on oil combined with low political accountability increases 
the economic vulnerability to external shocks. We sustain our argument with the analysis 
of the fiscal policies implemented in Venezuela under the administration of Hugo Chávez 
(1999-2012). A process tracing methodology focuses on the policy design of fiscal policies 
through the selection of instruments embedded in the Public Finance Management system 
(PFM), using a typology of the state´s resources of information, authority, treasure and 
organization. During this period, the constitutionalization of the resource nationalism acted 
as a trigger to change fiscal policies through four major reforms including the creation of a 
highly centralized PFM, the takeover of the Central Bank, the reform of oil legal framework 
and the takeover of the national oil company, PDVSA. All of these reforms converged towards 
the elimination and/or manipulation of the instruments of political accountability, allowing 
discretional management of oil rents and hampering the government´s capacity to react to 
the oil price plunge, which ultimately led to the current economic recession.
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Como a nacionalização de recursos dificulta o desenvolvimento: as raízes institucionais da 
recessão econômica na Venezuela
Este artigo analisa a forma como as instituições possibilitam aos governos enfrentarem 
grandes variações de receitas de petróleo e como esses fatores afetam as instituições 
públicas. Argumentamos que uma alta dependência do petróleo, combinada com baixa 
responsabilidade política resulta em maior vulnerabilidade a choques externos. Amparamos 
na análise da política fiscal implementada na administração de Hugo Chavez (1999-2012). O 
processo de monitoramento se concentra no desenho de políticas públicas para a selecção 
dos instrumentos que constituem o sistema de Gestão das Finanças Públicas (GFP) através 
de uma tipologia de recursos estatais de informação, autoridade e organização do tesouro. 
Durante este processo, a regulação constitucional do nacionalismo extractiva agiu como o 
gatilho para a mudança na política fiscal, através de quatro entidades que incluem a criação 
de um sistema de GFP altamente centralizado, o controle do Banco Central, a reforma do 
regulamento de petróleo, e controle da empresa petrolífera nacional PdVSA. Estas reformas 
convergiram para a eliminação ou a manipulação dos instrumentos de prestação de contas, o 
que levou a gestão discricionária das receitas do petróleo e afetou a capacidade do governo 
de reagir ao colapso dos preços do petróleo, culminando na atual recessão económica.
Palavras-chave: crise econômica, política fiscal, despesa pública, combustível fóssil, 
recursos naturais
Cómo el nacionalismo extractivo impide el desarrollo: las raíces institucionales de la 
recesión económica en Venezuela 
Este artículo analiza cómo las instituciones permiten a los gobiernos enfrentar grandes 
variaciones en las rentas petroleras y cómo estos factores afectan las instituciones públicas. 
Argumentamos que una alta dependencia por el petróleo, combinada con una baja rendición 
de cuentas políticas causa mayor vulnerabilidad a los choques externos. Amparamos este 
argumento al análisis de la política fiscal implementada en la administración de Hugo 
Chávez (1999-2012). El seguimiento de proceso se enfoca en el diseño de política pública 
por la selección de instrumentos que constituyen el sistema de Gestión Financiera Pública 
(GFP), mediante una tipología de los recursos estatales de información, autoridad, tesoro y 
organización. Durante este proceso, la regulación constitucional del nacionalismo extractivo 
actuó como el detonante del cambio de política fiscal, a través de cuatro entidades que 
incluyen la creación de un sistema muy centralizado de GFP, el control del Banco Central, 
la reforma de la regulación petrolera, y el control de la empresa petrolera nacional PdVSA. 
Estas reformas convergieron hacia la eliminación o la manipulación de los instrumentos 
de rendición de cuentas, lo cual conllevó al manejo discrecional de las rentas petroleras y 
afectó la capacidad del gobierno de reaccionar ante el derrumbe de los precios del petróleo, 
lo que culminó en la actual recesión económica.
Palabras clave: crisis económica, política fiscal, gasto público, combustibles fósiles, 
recursos naturales
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Introduction: The current crisis in Venezuela
In 2015 and 2016, oil prices reached hardly half their average level of the 2000-
2014 period. Contrary to previous episodes of sharp decline observed during the 
past three decades, the current trend is confirming the end of the commodity super 
cycle, due to expected long-term increasing supply and slowing-down demand for 
oil and other minerals (Baffes et al., 2015; Gayi; Nkurunziza, 2016; De Gregorio, 
2015). The first mechanical effect of this price slump is to increase the fiscal deficit in 
oil exporting countries, particularly in those highly dependent on oil exports where 
current prices are below the fiscal break-even price, such as Venezuela (Arezki; 
Blanchard, 2015; Fiti et al., 2016). 
Since the 1940s Venezuela´s politics and economy have been influenced by the 
existence of huge oil reserves. As of 2014 this country registered the biggest proven 
reserves worldwide (298.3 billion barrels, which represents 17.5% of the global 
supply), before Saudi Arabia (267 billion barrels), Canada (172.9 billion barrels), 
Iran (157.8 billon barrels) and Iraq (150 billion barrels) (BP, 2015). Three quarters of 
those reserves come from the Orinoco Belt and are actually made of unconventional 
hydrocarbons that have been included to the world reserves since 2006. As such, 
they are far more costly to extract than the light crude from the Persian Gulf. Yet this 
gives Venezuela a certain leverage on OPEC´s policies and makes their diplomacy 
quite influential in times of skyrocketing prices (Heidrich, 2016; Hellinger, 2016). 
Venezuela is not only part of the Latin American exception (Ross, 2012: 85) it is 
also a paradigmatic case of the “institutional” resource curse (Corrales; Penfold, 
2011: 72). As such, it shows how the effects of commodity price cycles on macro-
economic performance depend on existing democratic institutions (Vera, 2015). 
Hence, Venezuela has been for long characterized as a Petro-State and a rentier 
economy, whose fiscal profile has been generally weak and exhibits a long history 
of indiscipline and pro-cyclicality (Moreno; Shelton 2014; Talvi; Vegh 2000; Ochoa 
2008; Puente et al. 2006; Zambrano Seguín, 2010). Yet, this country is a case of 
oil endowment having contradictory effects regarding economic development and 
democracy. While early works have emphasized the negative effects of the rentier 
state on democratic institutions (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001), more recent studies have 
shown that oil rents might as well underlie democracy, at least until the 1990 crisis 
(Dunning, 2008; Ross, 2012).
A closer look at the relationships between institutional change and oil price 
variations should explain why such contradictory interpretations prevail on a single 
case, without twisting reality through data manipulation. Most scholars working on 
the resource curse thesis posit a relationship between the abundance of natural 
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resource rents and the weakness of political institutions, due to negative economic 
feedbacks of these rents1. However, existing institutions should either help 
governments or constrain them in order to control for the exogenous effects of price 
shocks and rent booming. How exactly do existing institutions allow a government 
to manage dramatic variations of oil rents, and how do these exogenous factors 
affect existing institutions is the twofold problem addressed by this article. 
The following sections explain how the institutional reform of the oil sector and 
the fiscal policy during the period preceding the fall in oil prices (1999-2012) caused 
the Venezuelan economy to plunge into the current recession. First we explain why 
Venezuela is a case of resource nationalism, in line with recent works on the resource 
curse thesis. Then proceed with a description of the method of policy analysis, based 
on causal process tracing and instruments mix, before presenting the collected 
data. Section four presents and discusses the main research findings regarding the 
institutional reform, the discretionary takeover of oil rents by the Executive power, 
and their consequences on political accountability and economic development. The 
final section presents conclusions on the consequences of resource nationalism in 
Venezuela and discusses traditional policy recommendations based on the resource 
curse thesis.
Background and literature review
The resource curse thesis revisited
Some of the most recognized works on the resource curse thesis came after the 
double oil price shock of 1973 and 1979. They mainly focused on the paradoxically 
negative consequences of oil endowment for development, since many oil exporting 
countries experienced lower growth performance than their oil-devoid counterparts 
(Gelb et al., 1988). This counterintuitive observation partly contradicted the basics of 
neoclassical economics on comparative advantage as a determinant for international 
trade and development path. Further studies on mineral economies confirmed the 
negative relationship between resource abundance causing high variations of mineral 
rents, and economic development (Auty, 1993; Karl, 1997; Ross, 2003). The rationale 
of the resource curse thesis is that when mineral rents exceed a certain fraction of 
GDP, public spending and total exports, they tend to unbalance the fiscal equilibrium 
by over-stretching public spending and by artificially reducing taxes, either directly 
(through tax reduction) or indirectly (through subsidies). Things go wrong when rents 
shrink —for price variations or stock exhaustion—, due to the low elasticity of public 
1 For a review of the literature on the resource curse thesis, see Rosser, 2006 and Ross, 2012.
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spending and the negative effects of the Dutch disease on commercial balances and 
terms of trade.
A subsequent generation of scholars interested in resource endowment identified 
a negative correlation between mineral abundance and democracy, sometimes 
coming along with a positive correlation with violent conflicts (Ross, 2001; 
Bannon; Collier, 2003). On the one hand, mineral rents finance public spending 
or support the accumulation of external debt, while alleviating fiscal pressure 
on citizens. On the other hand they provide governments with extraordinary 
resources for patronage and actors engaged in illegal activities with huge sources 
of extortion and corruption. Although the causality between mineral endowment 
and authoritarianism is still a controversial issue in quantitative research (Haber; 
Menaldo, 2011; Dunning, 2012), it cannot be completely discarded. As a matter 
of fact, many features of authoritarian regimes and populism —such as lack of 
accountability and discretional resource allocation used by the incumbent— do 
benefit from the increase of mineral prices and reserves. Likewise, many features 
of illegal armed groups —such as the control of strategic areas, access to point 
resources and high capacity to stress security infrastructures— are dramatically 
accentuated by commodity cycles. 
This brought out yet another generation of studies, interested in explaining 
how institutions are affected by the effects of mineral boom and bust cycles, and 
how they allow governments to mitigate those effects (Humphreys et al., 2007a; 
2007b). The research agenda shifted from economic development to democratic 
governance, hence questioning the role of governments on development beyond 
the mere effects of production factors on development (Karl, 2005; Collier, 2010; 
Auty; Gelb, 2011). Scholars now commonly acknowledge that natural resource 
endowment is hardly a curse in itself but rather comes from the existing political 
system regulating the economy, as well as the relationships between the state 
and society are what can doom development prospects (Karl, 2007; Stiglitz, 
2007; Kolstad et al., 2009; Bhattacharyya; Hodler, 2011; Aytaç et al., 2016). 
Moreover it is the volatility of commodity prices, rather than their absolute value, 
what constitutes a major challenge to any state because of its adverse effects on 
macroeconomic balances and political institutions (Ross, 2012; Timmerman, 2012; 
Omgba, 2015). But the general argument of the institutional version of the resource 
curse thesis is that commodity cycles have stronger effects on development and 
democracy when occurring in contexts of weak or unstable institutions.
Recent trends in the research on natural resource endowments have 
underscored the importance of institutional capacity to “escape the resource 
curse” (Humphreys et al., 2007a). Based on this relatively common assumption, five 
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recommendations have been made, neither of which is exclusive. The most radical 
policy recommendation is the non-exploitation of natural resources until institutions 
are sufficiently strong (Humphreys et al., 2007b; Sachs, 2007). Given the extreme 
difficulty and political risk implications of such a scenario, scholars have explored 
the benefits of direct distribution of the resource (Rodríguez et al., 2012; Segal, 
2012). Another solution is to create stabilization funds that would allow the state 
to save during windfalls the money they may need in times of resource scarcity 
or prices downfalls (Kolstad et al., 2009). Conversely, governments are advised 
to reduce subsidies when commodity prices go down, in order to reduce public 
spending and correct anomalies for further windfalls (Di Bella et al., 2015). Finally 
the minimalist agenda for policy change consists in increasing accountability and 
civil society control over resource rents (Karl, 2007; Ross, 2012). 
However, expecting that institutions would solve the resource curse raises more 
questions than it brings out answers for policy implications (Stevens; Dietsche, 
2008). Institutional change is actually a wicked problem, generally incremental 
and highly context-dependent. According to the context and the policy at stake, 
“ideational” factors are supposed to act either as critical environmental variables 
or as motivations at both the individual and the collective levels to shape policies 
(Berman, 2013). Yet we do not know how, since it turns out ideas are a catch-all 
concept, extremely difficult to observe and measure empirically, if not by narratives, 
discursive analysis and thick descriptions. A crude taxonomy of ideas combining 
these dimensions helps distinguishing policy paradigms from programmatic ideas, 
frames and public sentiment (Campbell, 1998: 385). Still, it does a poor job at 
explaining how ideas actually work on policy change, why some have no effect on it 
and others do, which ideas do change over time and which do not.
This eventually led to examine the role of governments in the management 
of commodity cycles and in particular the emergence of “resource nationalism” 
(Haslam; Heidrich, 2016a). During the 2000s’ oil windfall, especially in Latin America 
(De Castro et al., 2014), the resurgence of resource nationalism was a reaction 
to globalization and neoliberal policies of previous decades (Veltmeyer, 2012; 
Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Weitzman, 2013; Koivumaeki, 2015), as a way for 
governments to increase mineral rents through the control of the extractive sector 
(Hogenboom, 2012; Weijemars, 2015). It is not another word for nationalization, 
since it can rely on a minimum participation of the sector by the state through joint-
ventures and association contracts or on a full control through direct exploitation by 
state-owned companies (Haslam; Heidrich, 2016b; Ghandi; Lin, 2013). Neither is it 
a consequence of fast-growing oil prices (Mahdavi, 2014; Cheon et al., 2015), since 
resource nationalism was initially a way to compensate for low prices by increasing 
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the government-take in oil rents, occasionally through a higher control over the 
volume of production (Berrios et al., 2010). However it was arguably fostered 
by the late oil boom, due to the high leverage capacity acquired by the state in 
oil-exporting countries vis-à-vis multinational corporations and traditional OECD 
importing countries, as a result of the growing demand from emerging economies 
such as China and India (Vivoda, 2009; 2016). 
The Venezuelan paradox
Natural resource endowment can arguably make things easier or harder for 
governments, according to commodity boom and bust cycles, so it can be interpreted 
in very different ways, depending on the period examined. When focusing on the 
1958-1980 period, oil rents may have been decisive to the exceptionally resilient 
Venezuelan democracy (Dunning, 2008: 155) and the two-party system established 
by the “Punto Fijo pact”2, while many other Latin American countries were 
experiencing dictatorships. Yet considering the 1981-1998 period, when debt crisis, 
political instability and social conflicts emerged as a result of the counter-shock, 
oil rents may as well have been the source of all evils behind the rentier state or 
“Petro-State” (Karl, 1997: 85). Moreover, considering the 1999-2013 years, during 
which resource nationalism experienced a rebirth under chavismo, enhanced by 
exceptionally steady high prices, oil may as well have been the necessary condition 
for the rise and consolidation of a hybrid regime featuring a combination of hyper-
presidentialism and “vintage clientelism” (Corrales; Penfold, 2011: 16 and 25). 
Whether the post-2014 period might be a remake of the 1990s twofold crisis 
depends on many factors impossible to frame in this paper, but it will be determined 
by the current institutional system which gives an unbalanced configuration of 
power in favor of the executive (still under control of chavismo with President 
Nicolas Maduro) compared to the legislative power (won by the opposition coalition 
in 2015) (Kott, 2012; Monaldi, 2014; 2015). Unless a new institutional reform takes 
place —which would imply a makeover of the Constitution— resource nationalism 
is likely to remain strong in Venezuela, bolstering the unfolding economic crisis 
currently observed. 
Beyond the mere objective of increasing control over oil rents, the Venezuelan 
resource nationalism shows features specific to chavismo. At the core of this ideology 
2 Initially, the Punto Fijo Pact included three political parties: Acción Democrática (AD), Comité de Organización 
Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI) and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD). However, in practice, the 
political system of Venezuela was overwhelmingly controlled by the two dominant parties AD and COPEI. Since 
the pact was signed in 1958, out of 9 elected presidents, 6 were affiliated to AD, 2 to COPEI and 1 to Convergencia 
Nacional, an emerging association resulting from the fragmentation of traditional political parties in 1994. 
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there was a strong anti-globalization and anti-neoliberal sentiment (Mommer, 
2002). The use of oil rents was soon defined as a way to recover national sovereignty 
and fight US hegemony around the world, even at the cost of a “reprimarization” 
of the economy (Veltmeyer, 2012: 68). This gave way to a series of programs that 
were given consistency afterwards, when coined as the “21st century socialism” 
(Kirschke, 2013) during the 2002 political conflict that ended in President Chávez 
firing thousands of employees from the national oil company PDVSA (Petróleos 
de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima). These programs included the re-nationalization 
of the oil sector, the implementation of oil-led social policies against poverty and 
indigence, a diplomacy and international trade based on oil to foster cooperation 
among OPEC or non-OPEC countries (through national oil companies associations, 
infrastructure programs, oil swaps for services and consumer goods, etc.) (Hellinger, 
2016). Oil-backed loans, such as the Chinese Fund signed in 2007, or the energy 
cooperation agreement of Petrocaribe signed in 2005 involving 17 countries from 
the Caribbean and Central America, are some of the most salient policy efforts to 
build political alliances in the region and beyond through the unrestricted use of 
oil resources. Most of these agreements and other domestic and foreign programs 
financed with oil resources were initiated as of 2003 once the executive power had 
taken absolute control over PDVSA.
During the oil windfall of the 2000s, Venezuela became more dependent than ever 
on the oil industry, with oil reaching 96% of total exports between 2008 and 2014, 
compared to 60-70 % in the late 1990s (Monaldi, 2015). Today Venezuela is undergoing 
one of the most severe economic, political and social crisis of its Republican history. 
After slowing down at 1.3% in 2013 (compared to 5.6% in 2012, an election year) the 
GDP growth rate went negative at -4% in 2014 (Eclac, 2015). In January 2016, the 
Central Bank of Venezuela (hereafter BCV) released official economic indicators for 
2015 mostly confirming the country had entered into recession, with inflation rates 
soaring to 180.9% and a -5.7% output contraction (Bcv, 2016).
Currently, domestic production is virtually paralyzed which turns the country 
more and more dependent on imports to meet basic needs (Vera, 2015). Yet 
cash limitations due to declining income flows, soaring deficits and very rigid 
public spending levels (Oecd, 2014) have seriously restricted fiscal leeway and the 
possibilities to increase or even meet pre-crisis import levels. The combination of 
waned domestic production and restricted imports have triggered major shortages 
of consumer goods (including agricultural products as well as staples), which in turn 
have prompted food rationing along with time-consuming and permanent queues 
outside supermarkets and stores. Meanwhile, crucial services related to health and 
education have almost been suspended for lack of resources.
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In the meantime, the oil industry has progressively deteriorated both in its 
productive capacity and financial health (Fiorotti Campos, 2015). Total production 
has consequently diminished, and maintenance efforts have been minimal 
(Espinasa, 2012; Balza; Espinasa, 2015). Debt levels have also been increased to 
cover massive social projects and governmental expenditures in various areas, 
unrelated to the oil sector (Monaldi, 2010; Monaldi, 2015; Balza; Espinasa, 
2015; Vera, 2015). Moreover, despite little official disclosure on public finances 
performance, dispersed official publications, leaks or calculations on the overall 
financial situation have unveiled the increasing trend of public debt both by the 
central government and PDVSA at more expensive levels. All in all, the situation 
points to a crippled financial capacity and credibility that limits the possibilities of 
obtaining further financial support at reasonable conditions (Oecd, 2014), which 
have put into question the actual possibilities of default and social upraising faced 
by the country in the very near future.
Analytical framework
Rationale
We contend that the dismantling of the democratic institutional framework 
during the 1999-2012 period caused the current dramatic Venezuelan economic 
and fiscal crisis. The impact of the oil price slump was actually aggravated by the 
existing hierarchical governance mode (Author 2011), seeking to control directly 
and unrestrictedly oil rents and public resources, which fostered inconsistent public 
policies and poor accountability mechanisms. Hence, high dependence on oil 
combined with low political accountability caused more economic vulnerability to 
external shocks.
As of 1999 through the coming of a radical left-wing political regime headed 
by the recently elected President Chávez, Venezuela started a sweeping reform 
process across most policy sectors that established a clear preference for 
centralizing policy-making decisions and circumventing or substituting the existing 
institutional structures (Nilsson, 2013; Eaton, 2014). These new conceptions over 
the management of oil rents driven by “resource nationalism” (Haslam; Heidrich, 
2016a) actually created the institutional frailty that weakened political accountability 
and consequently unfolded the current crisis. 
The manipulation of informal institutions, through highly populist redistributive 
policies aimed at granting legitimacy to the charismatic leader, was a necessary 
condition for ideas to alter formal institutions and sustain the regime´s socialist 
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orientation. State institutions were transformed by the government in order 
to secure control over oil rents, through a series of reforms aimed at installing a 
“competitive” or “electoral authoritarianism” (Kornblith, 2013; Weyland, 2013; 
Mazzuca, 2013) through cautious “autocratic legalism” (Corrales, 2015). 
In particular, a new financial architecture was devised with hardly any regulatory 
controls over public spending decisions. Such a wrecking of the institutional settings 
progressively set in motion the collapse of the existing Public Finance Management 
(PFM) system. The lack of political accountability caused by this strategy prevented 
any corrective measure, even before oil prices would go down, when Dutch disease 
effects limited the domestic capacity of production and created shortages in the 
supply chain of consumer goods (Vera, 2015). By mid-2014, when oil prices started 
to crumble, Venezuelan public finances were already handicapped and on a steady 
course to a breakdown. 
Method
We sustain our argument through the analysis of the fiscal policy implemented 
under the Chávez administration (1999-2012), which covers three successive governing 
periods. Fiscal policy is strategic for the government, since it constitutes a major 
interface for oil rents seeking and resource distribution. To that extent, it is at the center 
of any master plan of economic development. Our process tracing focuses on the policy 
design through the selection of instruments embedded in the PFM. Each element is 
an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) condition of 
the outcome to be explained. This means no individual part is sufficient but only when 
taken together they constitute a causal mechanism, a system of interacting entities that 
produces the observed outcome (Beach; Pedersen, 2013: 29). 
The causal mechanism linking resource nationalism to the economic crisis 
scaling-up works as follows. The constitutionalization of the resource nationalism 
acted as a trigger to change the fiscal policy regime, through four entities including 
the creation of a highly centralized PFM (E1), the takeover of the BCV (E2), the 
reform of the oil legal framework (E3) and the takeover of PDVSA (E4). All of these 
reforms converged towards the elimination and/or the manipulation of political 
accountability instruments (E5), which allowed the discretional management of oil 
rents (E6) and hampered the government´s ability to react to external shocks (E7), 
leading to the scaling-up of the economic crisis (policy outcome). 
Data
The empirical observables that prove the actual causal effect of the mechanism 
are identified through the instruments of the fiscal policy regime. They are 
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classified according to the state´s resources of information nodality, legal authority, 
treasure and administrative organization (Hood, 1986; 2007). Taken together, these 
instruments constitute the core of the policy design through which political ideas 
turn into policy outcomes through institutional change (Howlett, 2011; Peters, 
2015). The combination of these four kinds of instruments indeed covers the overall 
spectrum of the fiscal policy regime, and their typology constitutes a source book of 
information processed during the research.
Beyond the Public Accounting System reformed in 2002 and 2005, there are very 
few nodality instruments during the observed period to trace development plans 
and social policies financed by oil rents. The most popular information instruments 
used are the so-called “missions” aimed at implementing social programs, and the 
plans of emergency aimed at solving problems of farming roadways and irrigation 
systems, structural funds, agro-industrial sanitation, etc. Instruments of authority 
are the cornerstones of hierarchical governance and therefore they constitute our 
main sources of information. Since the adoption of the new political Constitution in 
1999, many organic laws were adopted on the economic, political and social domains 
as well as on the hydrocarbons sector, planning, accounting, decentralization, 
public contracting, social audit, etc. Instruments of treasure are essentially made of 
specific funds, dedicated to social spending, national development, macroeconomic 
stabilization, bilateral cooperation, and other even more peculiar areas such as 
reconstruction, electrical infrastructure, etc. Finally, instruments of organization 
include national agencies, such as the Central Bank of Venezuela, the Vice-
presidency, PDVSA, and the Central Planning Commission, in charge of managing 




Immediately after the election of Hugo Chávez, decisive steps were taken to 
fully transform the country´s political, economic and social landscapes. The political 
movement he had created under the name of the Bolivarian Revolution (which would 
later come along with the concept of the 21st Century Socialism), contemplated 
the construction of a new Republic, the Fifth Republic, which would justify a deep 
institutional makeover and anti-status quo political trend. This movement can be 
qualified as a “radical effort to transform state and society into a vision worthy of 
Bolivar, a beacon of democracy, socialism, and enlightenment” (Carroll, 2013: 15). 
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President Chávez soon found support from the Supreme Court to organize a 
consultative referendum to reform the Constitution of 1961. Once the referendum 
was approved in April 1999, Chávez managed to assemble a majoritarian 
governmental coalition with 93% of the positions (Corrales and Penfold 2011: 
19) in the special and temporary assembly that would write the new Constitution 
for the Republic. The final version of the text was ready in December 1999, 
and introduced a new political regime and the opening key to the subsequent 
institutional transformations that would progressively unfold in the years to come. 
Overall, a new political regime was launched in 1999 with the adoption of a 
new Constitution that consented a straight movement toward the concentration 
of power by the President, by strengthening his position vis-à-vis the previous 
federal order and favoring the establishment of a hegemonic political regime. The 
constitutional reform introduced new conceptions about the role of the State in 
economic and social areas, and in particular about the role of the State in the oil 
industry and in the management of oil rents. Basically, the redistribution of oil wealth 
and other riches moved from a cooperative mode of governance, to a hierarchical 
one in which policy-making processes would be centralized, while accountability 
mechanisms would be restricted to allow a more discretionary management of oil 
rents on behalf of the people (Author 2011; Vera, 2015: 549). 
This required the design of a “new financial architecture” aimed at having direct 
control over public spending decisions by the President, through a highly centralized 
policy-making system and plenty of room for rent seeking behavior. In essence, the 
prevailing policy paradigm of “sowing the oil” was displaced by a model of direct 
distribution of oil rents through a centralized spending system (Ochoa, 2008). The 
aim was to fully capture and control at the executive level the oil rents generated by 
the oil industry, and conquer full discretion over their use through public spending 
strategies. To do so, a new fiscal scheme was needed: a new financial architecture 
highly centralized with little controlling mechanisms over public management 
decisions. 
The first reforming step towards the construction of a new financial architecture 
came with the enactment of the new Constitution in 1999 that demanded the 
full renovation of the Public Financial Management (PFM) system. Hence a series 
of amendments would centralize governing and administrative functions over 
the management of public finances, and a new law on fiscal management, on 
the monetary authority and on the extractive sector were adopted. These initial 
reforms were key for the construction of a new management model that would still 
see further adjustments and future unblocking. 
A new fiscal management law was accordingly enacted in September 2000 
as part of the new regulatory framework for the PFM system, the organic law 
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on financial administration of the public sector (LOAFSP, for Ley Orgánica de 
la Administración Financiera del Sector Público). The enactment of this law 
propelled institutional change with a new fiscal regime. On one hand, all major 
fiscal rules that were previously regulated through dispersed legal ordinances 
were integrated and harmonized into this one single legal text (Badell & Grau 
2011; Vera Colina et al.,2009). On the other hand, all fiscal subsystems were 
placed under the control of the Ministry of Finance, which was designated as the 
central institution to coordinate and supervise the different fiscal entities as the 
primary rector or governing fiscal body of the PFM system. 
Later on, additional institutional structures were created to assume central 
fiscal responsibilities, eventually duplicating those of the Ministry of Finance. For 
instance, in 2004, the Ministry of State for Financing Development was created 
to formulate and coordinate sectorial policies for development, assuming public 
spending decisions on parallel to the budget process undertaken by the Ministry of 
Finance. Likewise, in 2007, a Central Planning Commission was created to elaborate 
strategic plans for development, under the direct authority of the Vice-President 
of the Republic also duplicating budgetary decisions that would otherwise be 
conducted only by the Ministry of Finance´s Budget Office. Both agencies were 
created to plan fiscal action, including discussions on financial needs and budgetary 
requirements to fulfill them. Therefore, existing institutions like the Ministry of 
Finance and the National Budget Office would be undermined by their organic role 
compared to the new agencies’.
Additionally, the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) was significantly reformed 
in 2001, in order to adjust the main instrument of authority for the monetary 
policy to the new constitutional provisions. This agency was given a constitutional 
rank, which meant it was formally defined as a separate legal entity within the 
public sector, with technical, functional and financial autonomy to exercise its 
responsibilities (Badell; Grau, 1999; Martínez Dalmau, 2002; Vera Colina et al., 
2009) on monetary policies (money supply, regulation of credit volumes, interest 
rates, federal reserves, and so on).
The new law also considered reorganizing the internal structure of the BCV, in 
particular its governing body and its relationships with other institutions of the PFM 
system and the executive power. The new law replaced the General Assembly with 
a Directory Board, in which the President would have a bigger room for interfering 
in policy decisions since he (or she) would appoint five out of seven directors. 
The National Assembly would play a new controlling role by becoming an official 
overseer of the monetary authority (Rodner, 2002). 
Therefore, despite the newly empowered position of the BCV (granted by its 
constitutional rank), the 2001 law gave the President and the Ministry of Finance 
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wider attributions for interfering in the decisions of the monetary authority. This 
reconfiguration proved to be successful in decisions over the use of public funds 
and, more importantly, on creating fine tuning instruments needed to further 
unlock the fiscal restrictions that were still in place. 
Among other relevant changes of the PFM system, it is worth mentioning 
the creation of the National Development Bank (BANDES, for Banco Nacional de 
Desarrollo), as the main financial instrument within the new fiscal scheme (created 
in 2001), and the Treasury Bank (Banco del Tesoro), created in 2005 to further 
attend to the financial needs of the central government. 
The BANDES played a strategic role in financing and routing resources to the 
numerous parallel funds created during the studied period and representing a 
financial and operational platform for the extra-budgetary pieces of the newly 
developed fiscal scheme. This entity was initially linked to the Ministry of Finance, 
before being transferred to the Ministry of Planning, then appointed to the Ministry 
of State for Financing Development, and eventually assigned back to the Ministry 
of Finance in 2005. 
On the other hand, the creation of the Treasury Bank was envisioned as another 
central financial agency, parallel to the financial structure already in place. This bank 
was supposed to directly manage public debt servicing and amortization, as well as 
general international obligations of the nation (Guerra 2008). Later on it would become 
a regular piece of the public financial infrastructure, holding general accounts for public 
employees and for local needs not related to public debt in any way. Additionally the 
institution would actually manage internal public debt titles, collect some internal 
taxes, make payments instructed by the Treasury Office and operate a special 
fund for macroeconomic stabilization called (FEM, for Fondo para la Estabilización 
Macroeconómica) (Art. 1 of the Law that regulates the FEM) (Bcv, 2005).
The takeover of the oil rents
The third element of the initial block of reforms resulting from the 1999 
Constitution was related to the extractive sector. In November 2001 a new 
hydrocarbons organic law was approved to replace the former version enacted 
back in 1943. The 2001 version secured a greater involvement of the state in all 
primary extractive activities and, among other modifications, altered the weights 
of fiscal contributions generated by the oil industry. Royalties increased from 16,6% 
to 30% of the total production, whereas income taxes decreased from 67,7% to 
50% of net profits3. This new legal design increased the control of the government 
3 See Organic Law of Hydrocarbons enacted in November 2001 (Official Gazette No. 37323) and partially reformed 
in August 2006 (Official Gazette No. 38493). 
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over the petroleum sector, by imposing a minimum 51% state ownership in all oil-
related activities. Through the so-called “mixed oil companies”, the enforced “oil 
sovereignty” was consistently aligned with the hierarchical mode of governance. 
Beyond the fiscal impact of the changing structure of oil revenues, the reform 
expanded the strategic stance taken by the state within the extractive industry and 
restricted PDVSA´s bargaining capacity (Núñez; Pagliacci, 2007). The way this legal 
instrument limited the role of the company in the negotiations of new investment 
projects, was of major interest to the government, as it would further centralize 
and reinforce control over oil rent generation and public spending decisions, while 
providing more opportunities for rent seeking behavior. It was also a strategic 
element of the new financial architecture including less policy space and actors to 
negotiate decisions on public spending and resource allocation. 
The reforms that followed were also decisive in transforming the country´s fiscal 
scheme, yet they were originated in these initial set of changes introduced earlier 
and presented above. As a matter of fact they could not have been possible without 
the first block of reforms initiated with the Constitution of 1999, and in that sense, 
both initial and subsequent reforms are interconnected parts of the same causal 
mechanism. The sequenced and interlinked nature of the different reforms and 
amendments to the fiscal scheme taking place during the period under assessment 
is consistent with our argument of causality. 
These radical changes taking place once the new Constitution was enacted soon 
started to face critical resistance and defiance, prompting political tension and social 
turmoil. A failed coup in April 2002 was followed by a national strike that paralyzed 
PDVSA and the national oil industry, from December 2002 to January 2003. The 
critical situation gave the government an opportunity to push for greater reforms 
and further dismantle the company´s organizational structures. In 2003, two major 
changes would disrupt the previous fiscal order: on one hand the government 
decided to take direct and total control over PDVSA; on the other hand it imposed 
strict economic control through a fierce exchange regime system. 
The takeover of PDVSA was the result of a long struggle and public rivalry between 
PDVSA´s directory board and the government over the control and direction of the 
industry. Obviously the executive power had a different vision on how oil rents 
and assets should be managed, and what role the government should play in their 
management. Further, the election of Hugo Chávez introduced a new notion on the 
role that oil rents should play in the economy and specifically regarding the role that 
oil rents should play in his political strategy. These views were not completely shared 
by PDVSA´s board of directors, who represented a company that had developed 
important levels of political and economic leverage over the past decades before 
the election of Hugo Chávez. 
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Tensions between the government and PDVSA were no novelty (Corrales; 
Penfold, 2011: 76). As a matter of fact, since the nationalization of the petroleum 
sector, in 1976, the formulation of oil policies had been an arduous task grounded 
on efforts to align the interests of the national oil company with those of the 
government (Núñez; Pagliacci, 2007). All in all, designing oil policies was never a 
smooth process, but the situation had worsened with the large number of reforms 
taking place and the greater pressure by the executive on the company. Apparently, 
there was no easy transition to the new ideals of the recently established political 
regime, as suggested by the consecutive replacement of presidents directly 
appointed by the chief of the executive (four assigned in less than three years) 
(Núñez; Pagliacci, 2007). In February 2003, after the 60-day “oil strike” Chávez 
appointed a new Directory Board and dismissed most of the company’s employees 
and cadres (Corrales; Penfold, 2011: 78), overtly breaking up the prevailing tacit 
independence agreement (Núñez; Pagliacci, 2007). 
The last straw came over a year later (in November 2004), when the Minister 
of Energy and Petroleum, Rafael Ramírez, was appointed as President of PDVSA to 
hold simultaneously both positions. This highly strategic arrangement would last 
for almost a decade. From then on, both the formulation and the implementation 
of oil policies would be the sole responsibility of the same directory unit, with 
PDVSA becoming a functional instrument of the executive´s will, regardless of their 
technical and strategic knowledge of the petroleum sector. This move ended with 
the horizontal accountability granted by the separation between the government 
and the national oil company (Núñez; Pagliacci, 2007: 37). 
This ended ensuring the government larger control over public spending, 
through what would eventually become an extra-budgetary instrument of planning. 
On one hand it limited the actions that PDVSA could take on their own, regarding 
investment and maintenance projects not aligned with the government´s interests. 
On the other hand, it provided the government with unrestricted access to the most 
important source of public revenues, ready to finance both domestic and foreign 
policies. Hence by controlling PDVSA President Chávez managed to align, and 
actually merge, the policy aims of the executive with those of the national company, 
easing all strategies to come, regarding the generation and use of a particularly 
important type of national public income: oil rents.
Oil rents could then be fully assigned with a new fiscal role under PDVSA´s 
responsibility. In 2003 numerous social programs called “Missions” became a 
significant part of the company’s financial responsibilities. Up until 2014 these would 
add up over 9 billion USD, according to PDVSA’s financial records of 2011 and 2014 
(PDVSA, 2011: 158; 2015: 36). Moreover, complete control over PDVSA allowed 
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the government to create many quangos to carry on different activities, all directly 
financed by oil rents but not related to the core oil business. For instance, PDVSA 
was in charge of public supermarket chains at the national level, infrastructural 
programs, sports sponsoring, cultural activities, and so on. 
A new role was assigned to PDVSA in the implementation of public policies in 
economic and social areas. The new strategic guidelines and social co-responsibility 
consigned to the domestic oil industry implied that new public spending roles were 
actually considered as part of the company´s operational costs (Noguera 2004). 
This in turn affected the financial results from which income taxes and dividends 
were calculated for budgetary ends (Gerencia de Investigación Económica, 2005a; 
Gerencia de Investigación Económica, 2005b).
Finally, once the oil strike had been controlled, in 2003, the government 
established a fierce exchange control regime to be operated by the Commission 
of Administration of Foreign Currencies (CADIVI, for Comisión de Administración 
de Divisas), a new agency separate from the BCV and attached to the Ministry of 
Finance. This decision constituted a blunt change in economic policies and provided 
the central government with a new instrument to control public resources, new 
financing mechanisms and a clear advantage over the management of the public 
debt. Further, an officially fixed exchange rate, directly managed by the Ministry 
of Finance, gave room to a differential spread between the official and the parallel 
exchange markets, which the government took great advantage of (Zambrano 
Seguín, 2010) by restricting or facilitating the access to foreign currency and turning 
the process into a political instrument to retaliate or manipulate the private sector, 
dissenters and the opposition in general.
Political accountability and economic development
The 2001 hydrocarbons law and the 2003 takeover of PDVSA, along with the 
new spending roles that were assigned to the oil company, allowed the executive 
power to directly manage oil revenues without having to negotiate spending 
patterns or allocation decisions with any of the traditional budgetary actors. Thus 
an “indirect centralism” (Aponte Blank 2010) was specially devised with this new 
institutional arrangement, as PDVSA would progressively assume public spending 
responsibilities traditionally undertaken by the government.
At this point, the PFM system was highly centralized and the government largely 
controlled the monetary authority, the BCV, PDVSA and the exchange regime 
system through the CADIVI. However, in order to increase the discretional power 
over public spending and over the use of oil rents, additional reforms were needed 
to further unlock fiscal restrictions. Such ambitions became real in 2005 through 
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the third block of fiscal reforms modifying the BCV´s regulatory framework. This 
new reform was decisive in formally disbanding institutional limitations over the 
use of oil rents and institutionalizing extra-budgetary mechanisms for oil-related 
funds allocation. 
Foreign monetary reserves typically accumulated and managed by the BCV 
would be partially transferred to the National Development Fund (FONDEN, for 
Fondo de Desarrollo Nacional), created that same year. Beyond a certain amount, 
the accumulated foreign monetary reserves would be transferred to this extra-
budgetary fund. To determine the amount to be held by the BCV, a new discretional 
concept was created as a decision-making parameter: that of a “reasonable” or 
“accurate” level of foreign monetary reserves (Articles 75 and 114 of the Partial 
Reform of the Law of the BCV of 2005). The task of defining this “accurate” level 
was ambiguously assigned to the Directory board of the BCV (controlled by the 
government), and it was left in very broad terms regarding the methods of 
calculation.
Additionally, this complementary reform generated a new dynamic in the 
interplays between PDVSA and the BCV. For the first time since its creation (in 
1976), PDVSA could bypass the BCV for the traditional exchange of foreign currency 
obtained through oil exports. The new fiscal arrangement stated that PDVSA 
could officially keep part of the revenues coming from oil exports and deliver the 
remainder to fiscal agencies such as the FONDEN. As a consequence, from 2005 
onwards PDVSA would only exchange a fraction of oil-related revenues in foreign 
currency to the BCV: the one corresponding to budgetary obligations, according to 
the estimations over oil prices for the budget formulation. The rest would directly 
go to the FONDEN (Bcv, 2005).
The FONDEN is one of the most notorious off-budget recipients of direct transfers 
created during the studied period. It was created as a special fund to directly invest 
in the economy and as an instrument for the “New Economic and Financial Strategy 
of the Executive power” conceived to leverage a real and productive economic 
recovery, increase the levels of social investment and alleviate public debt 
management. All, in parallel to the main short-term fiscal tool: the Federal Budget. 
With the creation of FONDEN, many other separate funds were created to 
channel oil and non-oil fiscal resources in a discretional fashion. So far it remains 
unclear how many of those funds are still operating, the amount of resources they 
handle, the regularity of such allocations and (more importantly) the functions they 
carry on in the fiscal regime and other policy areas. However as an indication of 
their importance, suffice it to report that from 2005 to 2010 FONDEN received 29,9 
billion USD from PDVSA and 37,9 billion USD from the BCV (Bcv, 2010; Pdvsa, 2011).
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Conclusions and policy implications
Our research shows simultaneously that institutional factors are the independent 
variable of the economic crisis in Venezuela today, and how these factors were 
manipulated by the government in order to comply with the ideas of the new 
political regime. From 1999 to 2012, this country´s political regime was deeply 
altered, modifying the overarching governance mode. The country transformation 
particularly affected the national system of fiscal institutions and the oil sector, by 
and large the most important sector of the economy. The causal mechanism of the 
economic crisis was identified as a sufficient though unnecessary condition that can 
be traced through the selection and transformation of policy instruments by the 
government.
The new financial architecture was basically assembled with punctual and 
exceptional rearrangements. A new Constitution commanded the centralization 
over the control and direction of public finances, in particular to channel oil 
rents. The undermining of the Central Bank through a series of reforms to its 
legal structure allowed the executive power to directly interfere and control the 
monetary authority, granting the use of monetary policy to the fiscal ambitions of 
the central government. Consequently, the full takeover of PDVSA and the creation 
of a number of parallel financial institutions to control and direct public resources 
allowed full discretion over public spending decisions and over the management 
of oil rents, shifting budgetary exercises from public and political scrutiny to murky 
and sealed practices with fewer policy makers. 
These changes redirected the decision-making process from dispersed 
specialized agencies to a central system closely subordinated to the President 
and the Vice-president of the Republic. In particular, decisions on the allocation 
and distribution of public resources would be generated by a narrower number 
of newly created commissions directly attached to the Presidency office or by 
the Ministry of Finance. Likewise, these changes diminished pre-established 
controls on public spending levels and allocation patterns while making the 
fiscal regime much more intricate to control by other agencies (including the 
National Assembly, the Comptroller’s office, and civil society organization). 
The new financial system conveyed the causal mechanism to dismantle the 
previous institutional structure (with its fiscal rules, procedures and controls) 
to replace it with a new financial architecture more closely aligned to the new 
governance mode of the newly established political regime but it also made it 
less sustainable in the long run and much more susceptible to external shocks, 
such as commodity price swings.
How resource nationalism hinders development: the institutional roots of the economic recession in Venezuela
690 Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
References
Aponte Blank, C. El gasto público social durante los períodos presidenciales de 
Hugo Chávez: 1999-2009. Centros de Estudios del Desarrollo. 2010. Available 
[March 2016] at: <http://www.scielo.org.ve/pdf/cdc/v27n73/art03.pdf>.
Ardanaz, M.; Corbacho, A.; Gonzáles, A.; Caballero, N. Structural fiscal balances 
in Latin America and the Caribbean: new dataset and estimations. IDB Working 
Paper Series, 579, 32 p., 2015.
Arezki, R.; Blanchard, O. Seven questions about the recent oil price slump. IMF 
Direct, ms, 18 p., 2014.
Author, 2011.
Auty, R.; Gelb, A. Political economy of resource-abundant states. In: R. Auty (Ed.), 
Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
126-144, 2001.
Auty, R. Sustaining development in mineral economies: the resource curse thesis. 
Routledge, London–New York, 288 p., 1993.
Auty, R. State enterprise and resource based industry in oil exporting countries. 
Resources Policy. Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 275-287, Dec. 1988.
Aytaç, E.; Mousseau, M.,; Faruk Örsün, O. Why some countries are immune from 
the resource curse: the role of economic norms. Democratization, 23(1): 71-92., 
2016.
Badell; Grau. Comentarios a la Ley Orgánica de Administración Financiera Del 
Sector Público y sus reformas parciales. Badell & Grau. November 23, 2011. 
Balza, L.; Espinasa, R. Oil sector performance and institutions: the case of Latin 
America, IDB Technical Note, 724, 61 p., 2015.
Baffes, J.; Kose, A.; Ohnsoge, F.; Stocker, M. Understanding the plunge in oil prices: 
sources and implications. In: Global Economic Prospects, Jan. 2015: 155-168, 2015.
Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV). Resultados del Indice Nacional de Precios 
al Consumidor, Producto Interno Bruto y Balanza de Pagos. Cuarto trimestre de 
2015 - cierre del año 2015. Economic Report. Caracas, Venezuela: Banco Central 
de Venezuela. 2016. Available [March 2016] at: <http://www.bcv.org.ve/Upload/
Comunicados/aviso180216.pdf>. 
Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV). Política Económica Nacional: Marco 
Institucional. Informe Económico, 2005. 
Bannon, I.; Collier, P. (Eds.). Natural resources and violent conflict: options and 
action. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003.
Beach, D.; Pedersen, R. B. Process tracing methods: foundations and guidelines. 
Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press, 199 p., 2013.
Beach, D.; Pedersen, R. B., 2016. Causal case study methods: foundations and 
guidelines for comparing, matching and tracing. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press (in print), 2016.
Guillaume Fontaine e Cecilia Medrano Caviedes
691Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
Berrios, R.; Marak, A.; Morgenstern, S. Explaining hydrocarbon nationalization 
in Latin America: Economics and political ideology. Review of International Political 
Economy, iFirst: 1-25, 2010.
Bhattacharyya, S.; Hodler, R. Do natural resource revenues hinder financial 
development? The role of political institutions. Proceedings of the German 
Development Economic Conference, Berlin 2011, 11, 46 p., 2011. 
Blyth, M., 1997. Any more bright ideas? The ideational turn of comparative political 
economy. Comparative Politics, 29 (2): 229-250, 1997.
British Petroleum (BP). BP Statistical review 2015. 2015, Available [March 2016] at: 
<http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-
world-energy/downloads.html> 
Campbell, J. Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy. Theory 
and Society, 27 (3): 377-409, 1998.
Campbell, J. Ideas, politics, and public policy. Annual Review of Sociology, 28: 21-38, 
2002.
Carroll, R. Comandante. Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. New York, United States of 
America: The Penguin Press. The Penguin Group, 2013.
Cheon A.; Lackner, M.; Urpelainen, J., 2015. Instruments of political control: 
national oil companies, oil prices, and petroleum subsidies. Comparative Political 
Studies, 48(5): 370-402, 2015.
Collier, P., 2010. The political economy of natural resources. Social Research 77 
(N.4): 1105–32, 2010.
Corrales, J.; Penfold, M. Dragon in the tropic: Hugo Chávez and the political 
economy of revolution in Venezuela. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 195 
p., 2011.
Corrales, J., 2015. Autocratic legalism in Venezuela. Journal of Democracy, 26(2): 
37-51, 2015. 
Corrigan, C. Breaking the resource curse: transparency in the natural resource 
sector and the extractive industries transparency initiative. Resources Policy, 40: 
17-30, 2014.
De Castro, F.; Van Dijck, P.; Hogenboom, B. The extraction and conservation of 
natural resources in South America: recent trends and challenges. Amsterdam: 
Cuadernos del CEDLA, 103 p., 2014.
De Gregorio, J. From rapid recovery to slowdown: why recent economic growth in 
Latin America has been slow. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy 
Brief, 15-6, 17 p., 2015.
Di Bella, G.; Norton, L.; Ntamatungiro, J.; Ogawa, S.; Samake, I.; Santoro, M. 
Energy subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean: stocktaking and policy 
challenges”. IMF Working Paper, 15/30, 79 p., 2015.
Dunning, T. Crude democracy: natural resource wealth and political regimes. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 327 p., 2008.
How resource nationalism hinders development: the institutional roots of the economic recession in Venezuela
692 Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
Eaton Kent, Recentralization and the left turn in Latin America: diverging outcomes 
in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Comparative Political Studies, 4(8): 1130-1157, 
2014.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). América 
Latina Y El Caribe: tasas de variación del producto interno bruto. ECLAC. 2015. 
Available [March 2016] at:< http://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/pr/files/
tabla-pib-estudio_economico_2015_0.pdf>. 
Espinasa, R., 2012. Los dos mundos petroleros de América Latina. Debates IESA, 
June, 2012.
Fiorotty Campos Adriana. Venezuela: Resultados e desafios da reforma petrolífera 
dos años 2000. Revista Augustus, 20(40): 92-104, 2015.
Fiti Zied; Khaled Guesmi; Frédéric Teulon; Slim Chouachi. Relationship between 
crude oil prices and economic growth in selected OPEC countries. The Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 32(1): 11-22, 2016.
Gayi, S.; Nkurunziza, J. Trends in minerals, ores and metal prices. In: P. Haslam 
and P. Heidrich (Eds.), The political economy of natural resources and development: 
from neoliberalism to resource nationalism. London: Routledge: 35-52, 2016.
Gelb, A. et al., 1988. Oil windfalls: blessing or curse? Washington D.C.: Oxford 
University Press-World Bank, 369 p., 1988 
Gerencia de Investigación Económica. Revisión de las proyecciones 2005 y 
perspectivas 2006. Economic Report June 2005. Informe económico mensual. 
Caracas, Venezuela: Banco Mercantil, Banco Universal, 2005a.
Gerencia de Investigación Económica. Revisión de las proyecciones 2005 y 
perspectivas 2006. Economic Report September 2005. Informe económico mensual. 
Caracas, Venezuela: Banco Mercantil, Banco Universal, 2005b.
Ghandi, A.; Lin, C., 2013. Oil and gas service contracts around the world: a review. 
Energy Strategy Reviews, 3: 63-71, 2013.
Grugel, J.; Riggirozzi, P. Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and 
reclaiming the state after crisis. Development and Change, 43(1): 1-21, 2012.
Guerra, J., 2008. Estado y finanzas públicas de Venezuela. Nueva Economía, June, 2008.
Haber, S.; Menaldo, V., 2011. Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A 
reappraisal of the resource curse. The American Political Science Review, 105 (1): 
1-26, 2011.
Haslam, P.; Heidrich, P. (Eds.) The political economy of natural resources and 
development: from neoliberalism to resource nationalism. London: Routledge, 239 
p., 2016a.
Haslam, P.; Heidrich, P., 2016b. From neoliberalism to resource nationalism: states, 
firms and development. In: P. Haslam and P. Heidrich (Eds.), The political economy 
of natural resources and development: from neoliberalism to resource nationalism. 
London: Routledge: 1-32, 2016b.
Heidrich, P. The regional context for Latin American resource nationalism. In: 
P. Haslam and P. Heidrich (Eds.), The political economy of natural resources and 
Guillaume Fontaine e Cecilia Medrano Caviedes
693Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
development: from neoliberalism to resource nationalism. London: Routledge: 89-
102, 2016.
Hellinger, D., 2016. Resource nationalism and the Bolivarian revolution in 
Venezuela. In: P. Haslam and P. Heidrich (Eds.), The political economy of natural 
resources and development: from neoliberalism to resource nationalism. London: 
Routledge: 204-219, 2016.
Hogenboom, B., 2012. Depoliticized and repoliticized minerals in Latin America. 
Journal of Developing Societies, 28(2): 133-158, 2012.
Hood, C. The Tools of Government. Chatham: Chatham House, 178 p, 1986.
Hood, C., 2007. Intellectual obsolescence and intellectual makeovers: reflections 
on the tools of government after two decades”. Governance, 20 (1): 127–144, 2007.
Howlett, M., 2011. Designing public policies. Principles and instruments. Routledge 
Textbooks in Policy Studies. Oxon: Routledge, 2011.
Humphreys, M.; Sachs, J.; Stiglitz, J., (Eds.) Escaping the resource curse. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 408 p., 2007a.
Humphreys, M.; Sachs, J.; Stiglitz, J. Introduction: what is the problem with natural 
resource wealth?. In: Escaping the resource curse, Humphreys M., Sachs, J.D., Stiglitz 
J.E. (Eds.). New York: Columbia University Press: 1-20, 2007b.
Humphreys, M., Sachs, J.; Stiglitz, J. Future directions for the management of 
natural resources. In: Escaping the resource curse, Humphreys M., Sachs, J.D., 
Stiglitz J.E. (Eds.). New York: Columbia University Press: 322-336, 2007c.
Karl, T. L. Ensuring fairness: the case of a transparent fiscal social contract. In 
Escaping the resource curse, Humphreys M., Sachs, J.D., Stiglitz J.E. (Eds.). New 
York: Columbia University Press: 256-285, 2007.
Karl, T. L. Understanding the resource curse. In: Covering oil: a reporter´s guide to 
energy and development. New York: Open Society Institute: 21-30, 2005.
Karl, T. L. The paradox of plenty: oil booms and petro-states. Berkeley: UCA Press, 
380 p., 1997.
Kirschke, J. Hugo Chavez, Socialism for the 21st century and Venezuela´s narcissistic 
resource nationalism. Engineering and Mining Journal, July 2013: 60-65, 2013.
Koivumaeki, R.I., 2015. Evading the constraints of globalization: oil and gas 
nationalization in Venezuela and Bolivia. Comparative Politics, Oct. 2015: 107-125, 
2015.
Kolstad, I.; Wiig, A.; Williams, A., 2009. Mission improbable: does petroleum-
related aid address the resource curse?. Energy Policy, 37: 954-965, 2009.
Kornblith, M., 2013. Chavismo after Chávez?. Journal of Democracy, 24(3): 47-61, 
2013.
Kott, A.. Assessing whether oil dependency in Venezuela contributes to national 
instability. Journal of Strategic Security, 5(3): 69-86, 2012. 
Mahdavi, P. Why do leaders nationalize the oil industry? The politics of resource 
expropriation. Energy Policy, 75: 228-243, 2014.
How resource nationalism hinders development: the institutional roots of the economic recession in Venezuela
694 Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
Mazzuca, S. The rise of rentier populism. Journal of Democracy, 24(2): 108-122, 
2013.
Mommer, B. Global oil and the nation state. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 224 
p., 2002.
Monaldi, F. The Impact of the Decline in oil prices on the economics, politics and 
oil industry of Venezuela. Columbia SIPA. 2015. Available [March 2016] at: <http://
energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/Impact%20of%20the%20
Decline%20in%20Oil%20Prices%20on%20Venezuela_September%202015.pdf >
Monaldi, F. Oil and politics in Venezuela. Perspectives on the Americas, University 
of Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, 10 p., 2014. 
Monaldi, Francisco. La economía política del petróleo y el gas en América Latina. 
Plataforma Democrática, 2010.
Moreno, M. A.; Shelton, C. A., 2014. Sleeping in the bed one makes: the Venezuelan 
fiscal policy response to the oil boom. In Venezuela before Chávez: Anatomy of an 
Economic Collapse, edited by Ricardo Hausmann and Francisco Rodríguez, 220–43. 
United States of America: The Pennsilvanya State University, 2014.
Nilsson Martin The radical left in government: deepening and constraining 
democracy in Venezuela and Bolivia. Revista Andina de Estudios Políticos, 3(1): 70-
89, 2013.
Noguera, Carmen Julia. Coyuntura económica. Economic Report August 2004. 
Informe económico mensual. Caracas, Venezuela: Banco Mercantil, Banco Universal, 
2004.
Núñez, B.; Pagliacci, C. El diseño de la política petrolera en Venezuela: un enfoque 
de economía política. Banco Central de Venezuela 80 (Serie de Documentos de 
Trabajo Gerencia de Investigaciones Económicas): 51, 2007.
Ochoa, O. La institución fiscal y el rentismo en el desempeño económico de 
Venezuela. Nueva Economía, December, 2008.
Omgba, L. Why do some oil-producing countries succeed in democracy while others 
fail?. World Development, 76: 180-189, 2015.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Latin 
American Macroeconomic Outlook. In: Latin American Economic Outlook 
2015: Education, Skills and Innovation for Development, 29–60. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 2014. Available [March 2016] at: <www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/development/latin-american-economic-outlook-2015/
latin-american-macroeconomic-outlook_leo-2015-6-en#page1>.
Peters, G.. Advanced introduction to public policy. Cheltenham: Elgar, 203 p., 2015.
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), 2015. Estados Financieros Consolidados. 31 
de diciembre de 2014, 2013 y 2012. PDVSA. Available [March 2016] at: <http://
www.pdvsa.com/>. 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). Informe de Gestión Anual 2011. 2011. 
Available [March 2016] at: <http://www.pdvsa.com/>. 
Guillaume Fontaine e Cecilia Medrano Caviedes
695Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
Puente, J. M.; Daza, A.; Ríos, G.; Rodríguez, A. The political economy of the 
budget process: the case of Venezuela. IDB Publications 23298. Inter-American 
Development Bank. 2006 Available [March 2016] at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/
brikps/23298.html. 
Rodner, J. O. La Nueva Ley Del Banco Central 2001 (Comentarios). Academia de 
Ciencias Políticas y Sociales. 2002. Available [March 2016] at: <http://acienpol.msinfo.
info/bases/biblo/texto/boletin/2001/BolACPS_2001_68_138_445-466.pdf>
Rodríguez, J.; Morales, J.; Monaldi, F.. Direct distribution of oil revenues in 
Venezuela: a viable alternative?. Working Paper 306, Center for Global Development, 
38 p., 2012.
Ross, M. The oil curse: how petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 289 p., 2012.
Ross, M.. The natural resource curse: how health can make you poor. In: I. Bannon 
and P. Collier (Eds.), Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and action. 
Washington DC: The World Bank: 17-42, 2003.
Ross, M., 2001. Does oil hinder democracy?. World Politics, 53: 325-361, 2001.
Rosser, A. The political economy of the resource curse: a literature survey”. Working 
Paper 268, Institute of Development, 36 p., 2006.
Sachs, J. 2007. How to handle the macroeconomics of oil wealth?. In: Escaping the 
resource curse, Humphreys M., Sachs, J.D., Stiglitz J.E. (Eds.). New York: Columbia 
University Press: 173-193, 2007.
Segal, P. How to spend it: Resource wealth and the distribution of resource rents. 
Energy Policy, 51: 340-348, 2012.
Stevens, P.; Dietsche, E. Resource curse: an analysis of the causes, experiences and 
possible ways forward. Energy Policy, 36: 56-65, 2008.
Stiglitz, J. What is the role of the state?. In: Escaping the resource curse, Humphreys 
M., Sachs, J.D., Stiglitz J.E. (Eds.). New York: Columbia University Press: 23-52, 2007.
Talvi, E.; Vegh, C. A.. La sostenibilidad de la política fiscal: un marco básico. In ¿Cómo 
armar el rompecabezas fiscal? Nuevos indicadores de sostenibilidad, 1–25. Red 
de Centros de Investigación. New York, United States of America: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2000.
Timmerman, K. Understanding the resource curse: why some get more sick than 
others. Lehigh Review, 20: 33-43, 2012.
Veltmeyer, H. The natural resource dynamics of postneoliberalism in Latin America: 
new developmentalism or extractivist imperialism?. Studies in Political Economy, 
90: 57-85, 2012.
Vera Colina, M. A.; Finol Romero, L.; Urdaneta, J. G. Fundamentos de economía 
y finanzas públicas, Unidad II, Objetivo no. 6.” Universidad del Zulia, Escuela de 
Derecho. 2009. Available [March 2016] at: <http://www.econfinanzas.com/
econfinanzas/materiales/modulo6.pdf>. 
Vera, L. Venezuela 1999-2014: macro-policy, oil governance and economic 
performance. Comparative Economic Studies, 57: 539-568, 2015.
How resource nationalism hinders development: the institutional roots of the economic recession in Venezuela
696 Rev. Serv. Público  Brasília 67 (4) 671-696 out/dez 2016
Vivoda, V. Rise of state-firm bargaining in the 2000s. In: P. Haslam and P. Heidrich 
(Eds.), The political economy of natural resources and development: from 
neoliberalism to resource nationalism. London: Routledge: 53-69, 2016.
Vivoda, V., 2009. Resource nationalism, bargaining and international oil companies: 
challenges and change in the new millennium. New Political Economy, Dic. 2009, 19 
p., 2009.
Weijemars, R. Natural resource wealth optimization: a review of fiscal regimes 
and equitable agreements for petroleum and mineral extraction projects. Natural 
Resource Research, 24(4): 385-441, 2015.
Weyland Kurt, The threat from the populist left. Journal of Democracy, 24(3): 18-
32, 2013.
Weitzman, H. Resource nationalism: beyond ideology. Americas Quarterly, 
1/3/2013: 1-11, 2013.
Zambrano Seguín, L. Estructura e Incidencia de la Política Fiscal en Venezuela. 
Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2010.
Guillaume Fontaine 
Doutor em Sociologia pela Paris 3 University e pós-doutorado em Ciência Política pelo Instituto de Estudos Políticos 
de Paris (Sciences-Po). Atualmente é pesquisador sênior da Flacso (Equador). 
Contato: gfontaine@flacso.edu.ec
Cecilia Medrano Caviedes
Possui doutorado em Ciência Política e Governo pelo Instituo de Estudos Políticos de Paris (Sciences-Po) e mestrado 
em Política Pública e Econômica pela LSE. Atualmente é pesquisadora consultora no Natural Resource Governance 
Institute e no Centre d´Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) no Sciences-Po. 
Contato: ceci12@hotmail.com
